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Abstract. We find that the contemporary version of the dynamic Ramsey
problem omits one important variable that we take into consideration in this
paper. The effect of introducing of this variable into the analysis of dynamic in-
consistency is similar to that of introducing expected inflation into the Phillips
curve: we show that only a policy surprise affects the attainable resource al-
location set and the optimal policy. In contrast to Chamley (1986), we show
that intensive capital income taxation at the beginning of optimal policy does
not imply a lump-sum taxation of household wealth and cannot reduce the ex-
cess tax burden. We also demonstrate that the Ramsey policy is dynamically
consistent even without commitment. We resolve the Ramsey problem and
compare our results to those of Chamley on optimal capital income taxation.
: Key words: Inconsistency, Equilibrium policy, Optimal taxation
: JEL classification: E61, E62, H21
The optimal policy problem, as given by Fisher (1980) or Chamley (1986), omits
one important variable that we take into consideration in this paper. In order to re-
veal this variable, we introduce another variable x, implicit initial household wealth
lump-sum taxation due to policy revision, which we call expropriation. We demon-
strate that the only reason for inconsistency is the government’s desire to produce
a positive expropriation, x > 0. Thereafter, we introduce a new variable, that was
omitted by previous researchers, expected expropriation xe. Introduction of this
variable into the analysis allows us to rehabilitate the Fishers’ (1980) benevolent
government and to show that the Ramsey policy is, in fact, dynamically consistent.
The consequences of introduction of xe into the analysis are similar to that of in-
troducing expected inflation into the Phillips curve. Previous researchers implicitly
assumed that the attainable resource allocation set and optimal policy depend only
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on expropriation x. However, we show that the attainable resource allocation set
and optimal policy depend on the difference between the actual value and the ex-
pected value of expropriation, which we call the expropriation surprise, xs = x−xe.
This is the key result of this paper.
The central conclusion is that under rational expectations there is no reason for
the dynamic inconsistency of the benevolent government. Indeed, if expected ex-
propriation equals actual expropriation and xe = x, then the expropriation surprise
is zero: xs = 0. We show that only a policy surprise xs affects the attainable re-
source allocation and the optimal policy; consequently, the policy and the resource
allocation under any value of x will be the same as under x = 0. This means that
the government has no stimulus for inconsistency. In the Kydland and Prescott
(1977) terminology, this means that the optimum coincides with the equilibrium.
In this paper we revise the Chamley (1986) - Judd (1985) result of short run
intensive capital income taxation. This result holds if the government can commit
to future policy, which means in our frameworks that xe = 0. Under commitment,
the Chamley-Judd policy may achieves a higher value of the objective function than
a policy without commitment, as considered in this paper, because of a positive
expropriation surprise xs > 0.
However, a few arguments cast doubt on the Chamley-Judd result. The central
argument is that the Chamley-Judd policy lacks a measure of realism. This policy
implicitly assumes that the government can expropriate some part of household
wealth without affecting expropriation expectations. In fact, if expected expropri-
ation for some reasons differs from zero (either before or after the date the optimal
policy is first implemented), then the attainable resource allocation set will differ
from the one considered by Chamley; this renders impossible the implementation of
the Chamley policy. In our framework, under rational expectations xs = 0 and, con-
sequently, the government cannot achieve a lower value of initial household wealth
by means of intensive capital income taxation at the beginning of optimal policy.
The only effect of intensive capital income taxation is an unnecessary consumption
distortion.
Another argument against the Chamley policy is that for any given value of
expropriation surprise xs there exists a policy that is better than Chamley’s: con-
sumption taxation instead of capital income taxation can produce the desired value
of xs without producing the side effect of the unnecessary consumption distortion
implied by Chamley’s policy, and which we discuss in section 2.
Finally, the value of expropriation x in Chamley’s framework is given quasi-
exogenously. Chamley assumes that the consumption tax is zero and the capital
income tax is bounded at 100%. If we relax either of these hypotheses, we get a
higher value of expropriation than under the Chamley policy. Thus, the value of
expropriation in Chamley’s framework is determined by some ad hock hypothesis.
These arguments make us doubt that the policies of Chamley and Judd are in
fact the policies that we are looking for. It is not surprising that these policies have
not yet been implemented in any country.
We find the equilibrium policy (xs = 0) and compare it with the one of Chamley.
Under equilibrium policy, the Chamley-Judd result of zero capital income taxation
may hold not only in the long run, but indeed from the very beginning of the optimal
policy. However, our solution differs from the solution of Chamley and Judd in two
respects. First, our solution is dynamically consistent. Second, our solution is not
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just an application of the Chamley-Judd’s long run recommendation to the short
run: at the date a policy revision is announced, the consumption and labor taxes
should be adjusted in a special way in order to compensate the redistribution of
wealth resulting from the abolition of capital income taxation.
We show our key result using the primal approach to optimal fiscal policy prob-
lem, developed by Ramsey (1927), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Lucas and Stockey
(1983), Chari and Kehoe (1998) and many others. Chari, Christiano and Ke-
hoe (1996) apply the primal approach to optimal monetary policy problem; their
method directly extends our results to the issue of inconsistency of optimal mone-
tary policy.
Section 1 presents the model. We consider a continuous-time version of the neo-
classical growth model with endogenous labor similar to the one used by Chamley.
In sections 2 and 3 we show that both the attainable allocation set (section 2) and
the optimal policy (section 3) depend only on the expropriation surprise xs, but
not on x and xe separately. In section 4 we compare the equilibrium policy, which
is defined as xs = 0, with that of Chamley. Section 5 concludes.
1. Model
The representative household maximizes expected utility, which depends on con-
sumption C and labor L.
(1) max
[C,L]
E0
∞∫
0
e−ρtU (C,L) dt
We take the producer price of the final good to be equal to one. The consumer
price of the final good is equal to (1 + τC), where τC is the consumption tax. The
real wealth A consists of capital K and government debt B. The budget constraint
is given by
A˙ = rA+WL− (1 + τC)C(2a)
lim
t→∞A(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(z)dz ≥ 0(2b)
A0 − given,(2c)
where r and W are the after-tax equilibrium real rate of return and the real wage.
The co-state variable for equation (2a) is γ, and a is household wealth measured
in units of the utility function, a = γA.
We use the Dirac delta function and the Heaviside function to formalize the
household wealth expropriation effect due to policy revision. Let X(t) be the Heav-
iside function, which accounts for the accumulated wealth expropriation effect at
date t. We assume that X is constant during the periods in which the policy is not
revised, and if a revision takes place, it discontinuously jumps in order to account
for the new wealth expropriation effect,
(3) dX =
{
0, if there is no policy revision at date t
− lim
dt→0+
at+dt−at−dt
at−dt
, if there is a policy revision
Let x be the derivative of X with respect to time,
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(4) x = X˙
By definition, x(t) is the Dirac delta function, with x = 0 on the intervals where
the policy is not revised, and at the dates of policy revision the value of x tends to
infinity. However, the integral of x is bounded on any time interval.
The household takes into account the fact that the policy may be revised. It
expects that during dt there will be a revision of the policy with probability pdt.
If a revision takes place, there is an implicit expropriation of φ × a of the wealth,
where φ is a random variable defined on (−∞, 1) with a distribution function ξ(φ).
Let xe be the expected expropriation rate per time,
(5) xe = p
1∫
−∞
φξ(φ)dφ
Similarly to x, the variable xe may tend to infinity at some particular points of
time, but the integral of xe on any time interval remains bounded. In contrast to
x, xe may be positive on some time intervals.
The accumulated expected wealth expropriation effect is XE(t),
(6) XE =
t∫
−∞
xeτdτ
Expropriation surprise xs and accumulated expropriation surprise Xs are intro-
duced as follows:
xs = x− xe(7a)
Xs = X −Xe(7b)
The first order conditions of the household problem are (see annex B for details):
uC = (1 + τC) γ(8a)
uL = −Wγ(8b)
γ˙ = (ρ− r + xs) γ(8c)
Neither the density function ξ(φ), nor the probability of expropriation p are
present in the first order conditions (8); only xs is important.
Production is not of any particular importance in problems of optimal taxation;
see Judd (1999) for a discussion. We assume perfectly competitive markets and
constant returns to scale, which implies that there is no profit. The production
function depends on labor L and capital K, and is given by
(9) Y = F (K,L)
The rate of depreciation is δ.
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The capital income and labor taxes are τK and τL. The before-tax interest rate
and wage are rˆ and Wˆ : r = (1− τK) rˆ, and W = (1− τL) Wˆ . The firms’ first-order
conditions are given by
rˆ = FK − δ(10a)
Wˆ = FL(10b)
The government collects taxes to supply an exogenous amount of public goods
G. Its budget constraint can be written as
B˙ = rB +G− τCC − τK rˆK − τLWˆL(11a)
lim
t→∞B(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(z)dz ≤ 0(11b)
B0 − given.(11c)
Market clearing requires
K˙ = Y − C −G− δK(12a)
K(t) ≥ 0 ∀t(12b)
K0 − given.(12c)
The representative household can not solve its optimization problem while fiscal
policy is unknown. We suppose that there is a fiscal policy [τ˜C (t) , τ˜K (t) , τ˜L (t)]t∈[0,∞),
which may be suboptimal, but which is given ex ante. The household solves its op-
timization problem assuming that this policy may be implemented. However, the
household takes into accont that the government can revise the policy.
The government solves a modified Ramsey (1927) problem: it maximizes the
household’s utility (1) with respect to fiscal policy [τC (t) , τK (t) , τL (t)]t∈[0,∞) tak-
ing into consideration the wealth expropriation effects that occur if the optimal
policy diverges from the ex ante policy.
2. Expropriation and attainable allocation set
The set of allocations that are attainable by the social planner (who finds the
first-best allocation), is given by the resource constraint. This constraint may
be found by substitution of the production function (9) into the market clearing
condition (12):
K˙ = F (K,L)− C −G− δK(13a)
K(t) ≥ 0 ∀t(13b)
K0 − given.(13c)
The implementability constraint ensures that the allocation that resolves the
Ramsey problem can be decentralized without lamp-sum taxes. This constraint
requires that, for a considered allocation [C (t) , L (t)]t∈[0,∞), there exists a vector
of consumer prices that simultaneously satisfies the household’s budget constraint
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and its first-order conditions1. We can derive the resource constraint from equations
(2a) and (8). The expropriation-augmented implementability constraint is given by
(14) a˙ = ρa− UCC − ULL− xsa,
There are two differences between the conventional implementability constraint
(see, for example, Chari and Kehoe (1998)) and the inconsistency-augmented con-
straint (14). First, there is a new term xsa in (14). Secondly, for a given value of
X0, the value of a0 is also given.
The government finds the equilibrium under ex-ante policy [τ˜C(t), τ˜L(t), τ˜K(t)]t∈[0,∞),
and arrives at a˜0. The value of X0 is historically given. Consequently, the initial
conditions for (14) are given by
a0 = a˜0(15a)
X0 − given(15b)
Note, that a policy revision that produces a wealth expropriation effect at date
0 will change not only a0, but X0 as well.
The resource and implementability constraints with the initial and transversality
conditions exactly describe the set of allocations that may be implemented in a
decentralized economy without lump-sum taxes. The proof of this fact is well
known in the litterature, see annex A for details.
Proposition 1. The attainable resource allocation set depends on the expropriation
surprise xs, but not on x and xe separately.
Proof. The attainable resource allocation set is given by the resource constraint
(13) and the expropriation-augmented implementability constraint (14). We see
that only xs enters into these constraints. 
Proposition 1 reveals why our conclusions differ from those of Chamley and Judd.
Chamley and Judd implicitly assume that a positive value of x is possible only at
t = 0, and xe = 0 ∀t ≥ 0. This is why they arrive at the result that the more the
government expropriates at the beginning, the better the policy outcome.
However, expected expropriation affects the attainable resource allocation set,
and there is no reasons to believe that xe is always zero. If we assume rational
expectations and, xe = x, then xs = 0 and the expropriation x does not affect the
attainable resource allocation set.
3. Optimal policy for a given expropriation surprise
3.1. The modified Ramsey problem. Assume that the vector [x(t), xe(t)]t∈[0,∞)
is given exogenously. The optimal policy problem takes the form:
1In an economy with two goods, the implementability constraint coincides with the price-
consumption curve.
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max
[C(t),L(t)]
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU (C,L) dt(16a)
K˙ = F (K,L)− C −G− δK(16b)
a˙ = ρa− UCC − ULL− xsa(16c)
lim
t→∞ a(t)e
−ρt = 0(16d)
a0 = a˜0(16e)
K0 − given.(16f)
The co-state variable for the implementability constraint is λ (negative), and for
the resource constraint µ (positive). The first-order conditions are
UC (1− λ (1 +HC)) = µ(17a)
UL (1− λ (1 +HL)) = −µFL(17b)
λ˙ = xsλ(17c)
µ˙ = (ρ− (FK − δ))µ,(17d)
where the terms HC and HL are given by
HC =
UCC
UC
C +
UCL
UC
L(18a)
HL =
UCL
UL
C +
ULL
UL
L(18b)
The term Hi is a measure of the excess tax burden related to a particular form of
taxation. It plays the same role as the inverse elasticity of demand in microeconomic
analysis of the deadweight loss of taxation; see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). A
possible interpretation of (−λ) is the marginal excess burden of taxation measured
in terms of utility.
3.2. Optimal policy. Equations (17) and the constraints to the Ramsey problem
(16) give the resource allocation under the optimal policy. In order to determine the
policy itself, it is necessary to combine the first order conditions of the household’s
problem (8) with the first order conditions of the optimal policy problem (17) taking
into consideration the initial condition (16e). For convenience, we introduce here a
determining cumulative tax set that uniquely determines all tax distortions. This
set determines the optimal policy and consists of the following 3 cumulative taxes:
1 + TC/L =
ΦC
ΦL
(19a)
1 + TC(t+z)/C(t) =
ΦC,t+z
ΦC,t
exp
[
Xst+z −Xst
]
(19b)
1 + TC(0)/A(0) = (1 + τ˜C(0))
UC(C(0), L(0))
UC(C˜(0), L˜(0))
,(19c)
where
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ΦC,t = (1− λt (1 +HC,t))−1(20a)
ΦL = (1− λ (1 +HL))−1(20b)
and
1 + TC/L =
1 + τC
1− τL(21a)
1 + TC(t+z)/C(t) =
1 + τC(t+ z)
1 + τC(t)
exp
 t+z∫
t
τKr(s)ds
(21b)
1 + TC(0)/A(0) = (1 + τC(0))(21c)
Equation (19a) was found from (8a), (8b), (17a) and (17b), equation (19b) was
found from (8a), (8c), (17a) and (17d), and equation (19c) was found from the
definition a = γA, the constraint (16e), and equation (8a).
There is an infinite number of policies that implement (19) and decentralize
the optimal allocation. In order to get the only policy, we exogenously define the
dynamics of one of the tax rates. Suppose that the consumption tax is constant,
and its value is chosen to satisfy (19c):
1 + τC = 1 + TC(0)/A(0)(22a)
In this case, the optimal capital and labor taxes are given by
1− τL = 1 + τC1 + TC/L(22b)
τK rˆ =
T˙C(t)/C(0)
1 + TC(t)/C(0)
(22c)
Proposition 2. For any given dynamics of xs, the solution to the optimal policy
problem (16) is dynamically consistent.
Proof. From (16) it can be immediately seen that, if x and xe are given, the solution
to the problem is dynamically consistent: all state variables are in fact state vari-
ables, which do not include forward-looking terms. If a formal argument is required,
the consistency may be shown, for example, by comparing the solutions obtained
by two alternative methods: the Pontriagin and Bellman principles. The Pontria-
gin principle maximizes the discounted value of the objective function and may be
dynamically inconsistent. The Bellman principle recognizes that in the future there
will be chosen a plan that is optimal for that period, and that resolves the con-
sistency problem. From the fact that these two solutions are equivalent, it follows
that the solution to the optimal policy problem is dynamically consistent. 
A special case is xst = 0 ∀t. An application of proposition 4 to this case is that
under xs = 0 the optimal policy is also dynamically consistent.
Proposition 3. Optimal policy depends on expropriation surprise xs, but not on
x and xe separately.
Proof. See the equations that describe the optimal policy (19). 
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Proposition 3 supplements proposition 3, and says that not only the attainable
resource allocation set, but the optimal policy as well depends only on the expro-
priation surprise.
Propositions 3 and 5 encourage us to analyze the equilibrium policy, defined as
xst = 0 ∀t ≥ 0, instead of the policy of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985).
4. Equilibrium policy
Let us consider the case of equilibrium policy, xst = 0 ∀t ≥ 0. A special case of
the equilibrium policy is policy without expropriation, where xet = xt = 0 ∀t.
For the case of equilibrium policy, our conclusions are similar to the long run
conclusions of Chamley and Judd. If HC is constant, the optimal cumulative tax
TC(t)/C(0) is zero (see (19b), (20a) and (17c)). Equation (22c) shows that the
optimal capital income tax in this case is also zero. This is possible in the two cases:
either in the case of isoelastic preferences (for example, U(C,L) = C
1−θ−1
1−θ +V (L)),
or if the economy is on the balanced growth path2.
There are two differences between the equilibrium policy and the policy of Cham-
ley and Judd. First, the equilibrium policy is dynamically consistent. Second, the
optimal capital income tax under the equilibrium policy may be zero not only in
the long run, but also in the short run.
However, our solution does not replicate the Chamley and Judd long run rec-
ommendations into the short run: in the short run the optimal consumption and
labor taxes are adjusted in order to avoid any change in a0. For example, a capital
income tax reduction increases the shadow price of the household wealth. In order
to compensate for this effect, the government needs to increase the consumption
tax and to decrease the labor tax.
If we neglect certain second-order effects that we discuss in the next paragraph,
then the required changes in consumption and labour taxes may be approximately
calculated in the following manner. Suppose that a decrease in the capital income
tax increases the after-tax interest rate by 10%. Then the capitalists become 10 %
richer, and to compensate this effect, the consumer price of the final good (1+ τC)
should be increased by 10%. The new value of the labour tax should ensure that
the infratemporal government budget constraint is satisfied.
This arithmetics works well in Y=AK - type models, and when the excess tax
burden of distortionary taxation is not too high. However, in the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans framework, the effect of a decrease of τK on a is lower, and requires
a smaller increase of the consumption tax. In addition, the capital income tax
reduction produces another effect: this tax should be substituted by others. This
will increase the cumulative tax TC/L, decrease the labor supply, decrease the before
tax interest rate, and reduce a0, and this requires a decrease in the consumption
tax.
In the general case, it is not clear whether a particular tax should be increased
or decreased.
Note that on the balanced growth path all taxes are constant. Consequently, the
optimal debt to GDP ratio is also constant.
2These two cases are not too different: the balanced growth path is possible only if preferences
are isoelastic in consumption for the realized allocation.
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5. Conclusions
Previous papers implicitly assumed that the attainable allocation set and the
optimal policy depend on the expropriation of household wealth due to a policy
revision at the beginning of optimal policy. However, we show that only an ex-
propriation surprise affects the attainable resource allocation set and the optimal
policy.
If we knew exactly what affects expected expropriation, we could define the at-
tainable set of expropriation surprises and maximize households’ utility on this set.
However, expectations of expropriation depend on a large number of factors, such
as credibility, commitment, history, economic and cultural development, govern-
ment debt, sunspots in terms of Azariadis, and so on. The exact relationships are
unknown, so we cannot solve the problem of maximization.
However, a long discussion in 1970s and 1980s on the ways inflationary expecta-
tions are formed induced researchers to use rational expectations by default. The
reason why the rational expectations hypothesis prevails in contemporary research
is the weakness of the alternatives: any other particular hypothesis is worse than
that of rational expectations. In our framework, under rational expectations x = xe,
wherefrom xs = 0, and the government cannot affect the attainable allocation set
by means of an implicit expropriation of household wealth at the beginning of the
optimal policy.
Under xs = 0 intensive capital income taxation at the beginning of the optimal
policy does not imply a lump-sum taxation of households’ initial wealth, and creates
only an unnecessary consumption distortion. Thus, in contrast to the Chamley
result, we show that intensive capital income taxation at the beginning of optimal
policy is suboptimal.
The only reason for the inconsistency of the Chamley policy is the desire to
produce a positive expropriation surprise. Under rational expectations xs = 0
and therefor an expropriation surprise is impossible and the policy is dynamically
consistent.
Appendix A. The attainable allocation set (comments to section 2)
The derivation of the attainable allocation set that we use in section 2 is well-
known in the literature, see, for example, Lucas and Stockey (1983).
We get the resource (13) and implementability (14) constraints from conditions
that are satisfied for any equilibrium allocation, consequently, they are also satisfied
for any equilibrium allocation.
If an allocation [C(t), L(t)]t∈[0,∞) satisfies equation (14), then, for any given
strictly positive dynamics of one of the consumer prices [r(t), τc(t),W (t)]t∈[0,∞),
there exists dynamics of the other prices such that the household will choose the
given allocation. Indeed, the first-order conditions (8) and diffenitions a = γA and
(3) give prices such that these conditions are satisfied, and substitution of these
prices into the implementability constraint gives the households’ budget constraint;
consequently, the last is also satisfied.
If an allocation [C(t), L(t)]t∈[0,∞) satisfies the resource constraint (13), then we
can find the dynamics of the producer prices
(
rˆ, Wˆ
)
under which firms will choose
an input-output vector such that the equilibrium market condition is satisfied.
Indeed, from equation (13) and the initial conditions we can calculate the dynamics
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of K that gives the dynamics of output Y = C + G + K˙ + δK. Knowing the
dynamics of Y , K, and L, the firms’ first-order conditions can be used to find the
prices
(
rˆ, Wˆ
)
under which the firms choose the considered allocation, rˆ = FK and
Wˆ = FL.
If both constraints are satisfied, the government budget constraint is also sat-
isfied by Walras’ law. Thus, these constraints guarantee that there exist vectors
of consumer and producer prices such that all equilibrium conditions are satisfied.
The cumulative tax rates that decentralize the considered allocation may be found
from the difference between the consumer and producer prices, for example,
1 + TC,L =
(1 + τC)
W/Wˆ
.
Appendix B. First-order conditions to the wealth
expropriation-augmented household problem
Let V (A(t), X(t), t) be the value function,
(23) V (A(t), X(t), t) = max
[C,L]
Et
∞∫
t
e−ρτU (C,L) dτ
Taking into account that
(24)
EtV (A(t+ dt), X(t+ dt), t+ dt) = (1− pdt)V (A(t+ dt), X(t), t+ dt)
+pdt
1∫
−∞
V (A(t+ dt), X(t) + φ, t+ dt)ξ(φ)dφ,
the Bellman equation can be written as:
(25)
0 = max
[C,L]
(
e−ρtU (C,L)+
V (A(t+ dt), X(t), t+ dt)− V (A(t), X(t), t)
dt
+
p
1∫
−∞
(V (A(t+ dt), X(t) + φ, t+ dt)− V (A(t+ dt), X(t), t+ dt)) ξ(φ)dφ

We will use a Taylor decomposition for the second term, and substitute A˙ from
(2). Taking the limit as dt→ 0+, this gives:
0 = max
[C,L]
(
e−ρtU (C,L)+(26)
VA(A(t), X(t), t)(rA+WL− (1 + τC)C) + Vt(A(t), X(t), t) +
p
1∫
−∞
(V (A(t), X(t) + φ, t)− V (A(t), X(t), t)) ξ(φ)dφ

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Equation (26) is the Bellman equation for the problem. The first-order conditions
are:
e−ρtUC = (1 + τC)VA (A(t), s(t), t)(27a)
e−ρtUL = −WVA (A(t), s(t), t)(27b)
Let γ be the shadow price of the household’s wealth:
(28) γ = VAeρt,
then equations (27) give (8a) and (8b).
Application of the envelope theorem gives:
(29)
0 = VAA(A(t), X(t), t)A˙+ rVA(A(t), X(t), t) + VAt(A(t), X(t), t)
p
1∫
−∞
(VA(A(t), X(t) + φ, t)− VA(A(t), X(t), t)) ξ(φ)dφ

Differentiate (28) with respect to time:
(30) γ˙ =
(
VAAA˙+ VAt
)
eρt + ργ
From equations (28), (29) and (30), taking into account (3), (4), and (5) we
arrive at the last first-order condition to the expropriation-augmented household
problem (8c).
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